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HOPE FOR ATOMIC VETS: THE PROPOSED
VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION
ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW ACT
KAREN LEE HOCHSTEIN*

The international consensus against human experimentation is
clear.... That any judicial tribunal would choose to place a class
of persons outside the protection of the law against human rights
violations is a saddening demonstration of the extent to which [an
American court] has lost the spirit which once animated our
discussions.'
1. INTRODUCTION

Between 1945 and 1962 over two-hundred fifty thousand veterans
were exposed to atomic radiation while participating in the atmospheric
nuclear weapons testing program conducted by the United States at the
Nevada and Pacific test sites, or while occupying Hiroshima and Nagasaki following the atomic detonations in those cities. 2 At the Nevada test
site, military personnel positioned at various distances from the epicenter
of the blasts observed the physical effects of the blasts and measured the
degree to which radiation was transported over field.
Units of soldiers were made to crouch in trenches or walk straight
toward the umbrage until heat, dust, and fallout prevented them from
proceeding further. 3 Film badges were worn by the soldiers to record
external levels of gamma and beta radiation. 4 Under frequently chaotic
conditions, the badges were read by military personnel, many of whom
were inadequately trained to process and interpret the badges; 5 moreover, many of the badges were lost or misidentified. Monitors were used
to mark the boundaries of contaminated areas. However, due to faulty
calibration procedures and high operator error, soldiers who were be* Director of Congressional

Relations/Member,

FCC Federal-State Joint Board Staff,

National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (1984-1986). B.A. 1978, University of
California at Santa Cruz; J.D. 1984, Antioch School of Law.
I Jaffe et al v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981).
2 Senator Alan K. Simpson, remarks before the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, Hearings on S. 636, April 6, 1983 p. 6.
- Hearing before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources on S. 1482, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess., April 8, 1982, p. 41.
4 Gamma rays are released by atomic radiation as it travels slowly along its course; beta rays
are released at high speed.
See note 3, supra.
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lieved to be in uncontaminated areas were actually exposed to high levels
of radiation. 6 Not surprisingly, many of the recorded exposure levels
inaccurately reflect actual doses of radiation received by the test participants. These readings form the basis for the government's determina7
tions concerning the health effects of exposure to atomic radiation.
Years later, the participants of these tests displayed an increased incidence of disease, including cancer, leukemia, thyroid disorders, skin
disorders, lymphomas, and genetic disorders. 8 Believing that these illnesses were induced or aggravated by their exposure to atomic radiation,
"atomic veterans" and their survivors sought, with little success, relief
from the Veterans Administration in the form of health care, disability
compensation, and survivor benefits. 9
Veterans wishing to challenge the Agency's near uniform denial of
their claims for benefits have encountered a leviathan legal obstacle in the
form of a statutory bar to judicial review. 10 The Proposed Veterans Administration Adjudication Procedures and Judicial Review Act," introduced in the 96th, 97th, 98th and 99th Congresses, would eliminate the
bar to judicial review. The bill would also require agency rulemaking to
conform to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act applica2
ble to informal rulemaking.'
6 David Albright, on behalf of the National Veterans Law Center, written testimony submitted
to the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs on S. 636, April 6, 1983 p. 7.
7 Gott v. Cleland, No. 80-0906, mem. op. (D.D.C. September 30, 1981) p. 6.
8 See generally, The Forgotten Guinea Pigs,A Report On Health Effects Of Low-Level Radiation
Sustained As A Result Of The Nuclear Weapons Testing Program Conducted By The United States
Government, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rpt. No. 96-IFC, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (August, 1980).
9 As of October 1981, only 1% of all radiation claimants had received veterans benefits for their
radiation-related disabilities. Statement of Jack Leavitt, National Association of Atomic Veterans,
before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Hearings on S.1483, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., April 8, 1982 p. 63.
10 38 U.S.C. § 21 l(a). There are judicially created exceptions to this bar. See Johnson v. Robson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (constitutional challenge to legislation pertaining to the Veterans Administration is not a denial of benefits within the meaning of statutory bar to judicial review); Plato v.
Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 2195 (D. Md. 1975) (constitutionality of Veterans Administration procedures not barred from judicial review); Wayne State University v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir.
1978); Kirkuff v. Cleland, 516 F. Supp. 351 (D.D.C. 1981); Carter v. Cleland, 642 F.2d (D.C. Cir.
1981) (underlying statutes or regulations allegedly violative of statutory intent not barred from judicial review); Gott v. Cleland, No. 80-0906 (D.D.C. October 1, 1981) (Veterans Administration's
failure to comply with its own regulations is not barred from judicial review).
Recently, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that
the § 21 l(a) bar extends to challenges of U.A. rulemaking procedure. At issue was the Agency's
issuance of documents involving the resolution of radiation claims. Gott v. Walters, (No. 82-1159,
March 22, 1985). There documents are discussed in section IV, infra.
11 S. 636, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., March 1, 1983; S. 367, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., January 31, 1985.
12 5 U.S.C. § 553(a).

1986]

PROPOSED VETERANS ADMINISTRATION ACT

237

14
This Comment will discuss the judicial review' 3 and rulemaking
provisions of the bill and their possible impact on efforts by atomic veterans to obtain benefits from the Veterans Administration. Part II will
provide an overview of the Veterans Administration's claims procedures,
describing the criteria currently applied to claims of atomic veterans and
the changes contained in the bill. Part III will discuss the critical sections of the bill, including the unique standard of review' 5 for factual
determinations made in adjudicating individual claims for benefits. In
particular, Part III will discuss potential problems posed to reviewing
courts applying the standard of review. Part IV will discuss the rulemaking changes contained in the bill. The Comment will conclude by suggesting that an effective method of compensating atomic veterans for
their injuries would be to ensure by statute that they are eligible to obtain
disability benefits from the Veterans Administration. Such a mandate
would make more meaningful the opportunity for judicial review and
greater participation in agency rulemaking contained in the legislation
discussed herein.

II.

OVERVIEW OF AGENCY CLAIMS PROCEDURES

By statute, 16 a veteran is entitled to health care and disability compensation for illness or disability caused by or aggravated during military
service. All veterans must prove that an alleged disability is "serviceconnected. "17
Some chronic diseases, such as active tuberculosis and multiple sclerosis, are presumed by statute 8 to be service-connected. However, with
the exception of malignant tumors and leukemia, illnesses believed by
atomic veterans to be radiation-related do not currently fall within the
list of presumed disabilities. Even if an atomic veteran has leukemia or a
malignant tumor, the illness must have manifested itself to a degree of
10% during service or one year following severance from active duty. ' 9
A. Present ProceduresFor Adjudicating Claims
The present claims adjudication process consists of three stages that
13 S. 637 § 301, et seq.
14 Id.§ 201.
1 Id.§ 4026(a)(1)(D).
16 38 U.S.C. § 333.
17 Id.

18 38 U.S.C. § 334. P.L. 98-542 the Veterans Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation
Standards Act established an advisory committee to make determinations as to service-connection
for diseases for which "sound scientific evidence" indicates a connection to radiation exposure.
19 38 C.F.R. § 3.151.
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can be characterized as 1) prehearing, 2) hearing, and 3) review by the
Board of Veteran Appeals.
1. Prehearing
A veteran initiates proceedings by filing an initial application for
health care or disability compensation with a regional Veterans Administration office for review by a rating board. 20 If the disability is found to
be service-connected, the board will rely on statutory tables 2' to "rate"
the degree of disability to a corresponding level of compensation.
Atomic veterans encounter a fundamental obstacle at this preliminary
stage.
Central to the failed attempts of atomic veterans who endeavor to
obtain benefits from the Veterans Administration is their inability to establish service-connection for their disabilities. Of the 2,067 claims for
disability compensation and health care filed by atomic veterans with the
agency in 1983, only 29 were approved for service-connection. 22 Establishing service-connection is made improbable by the fact that cancer
caused by exposure to atomic radiation cannot be discerned from cancer
caused by other factors. Establishing service-connection under existing
procedures is thus compounded by the length of time it takes for a radiation-related illness, such as cancer, to develop, thus triggering the suspicion that intervening factors might have played a significant role in
causing or aggravating the disease. Although it has been demonstrated
that exposure to radiation increases the likelihood of developing certain
forms of cancer and other diseases, 23 the Veterans Administration maintains that existing evidence fails to establish a definitive link between exposure to atomic radiation and most of the diseases occuring in atomic
veterans.

24

See generally, Simon, "Is Uncle Sam Toying With Veterans?, District Lawyer, vol. 6, No. 4
March/April 1982.
21 Id.
22 "V.A. Finally Agrees To Free Medical Care For 'Atomic Veterans.'" Washington Post, April
7, 1983 p. A2, col. 5, 6.
23 Dr. Edward Martell, National Center for Atmospheric Research, Statement on Radiation Exposure Levels and Delayed Health Effects ExperiencedBy Atomic Veterans, to the Senate Committee
on Veterans Affairs, Hearings on S. 11, April 6, 1984 p. 4.
24 45 Fed. Reg. 86605-86607. The Veterans Health Care Training and Small Business Loan Act
of 1981 specifically addressed the difficulty encountered by veterans exposed to atomic radiation or
dioxin in establishing service-connection for their illnesses. The Act requires the Veterans Administration to provide free medical treatment to veterans for any illness that may have developed as a
result of exposure to atomic radiation or dioxin. The statute does not confer service-connected status to the illness; it merely treats an illness as if it were service-connected solely for the purpose of
providing medical care. However, the implementing regulations limit treatment under the Act for
radiation claimants only to those veterans suffering from cancer or thyroid disorders.
20
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2. Hearing
If the veteran's claim for benefits is denied at the prehearing stage,
claimant
will receive a Notice of Decision. 25 Following receipt of the
the
Notice of Decision, a veteran has 60 days in which to request a hearing
before a three-member board at the regional agency office, during which
time he may adduce additional evidence with which to support his
26
claim.
The burden of proof is on the veteran to submit evidence to justify a
27
belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim is well-grounded.
2
8
By regulation, the Veterans Administration is required to resolve a reasonable doubt raised by the evidence in favor of the veteran; however,
this policy is not adhered to during the adjudication of radiation
29
claims.
3. Review By The Board Of Veteran Appeals
If the decision at the hearing stage is adverse to the veteran, he may
31
file a Notice of Disagreement 30 with the office of original jurisdiction.
Upon receipt of the Notice of Disagreement, the Veterans Administration may choose to uphold or alter its decision. If it chooses to uphold
the decision, the agency will prepare a Statement of the Case. 32 The
Statement of the Case represents the final determination rendered by the
office of original jurisdiction.3 3 If the veteran wishes to challenge that
determination, he must file a substantive appeal3 4 with the Board of Veteran Appeals in Washington, D.C. where he is entitled to de novo review
of his claim. 35 The Board is required by statute to base its decision on
the entire record, although it is not expressly limited to decision-making
based exclusively on the record.3 6 The Board of Veteran Appeals reverses
only one of every eight decisions by the regional offices; one of every six
decisions is remanded by the Board for further development of the rec25 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(d).
26 Id.

27 38 C.F.R. § 3.102.
28 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a).
29 See generally, Veterans Administration Case Summaries of Successful Cases Presented By

Atomic Veterans, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources on S. 1483,
97th Cong. 2d Sess., April 8, 1982 p. 31.
30 38 C.F.R. § 19.118(a).
31 38 U.S.C. § 4004; 38 C.F.R. § 12.120.
32 38 U.S.C. § 4005(d).
33 See note 20, supra.
34 Id.
33 See note 20, supra.
16 38 U.S.C. § 4005(d).
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ord.3 7 If the Board of Veteran Appeals determination is adverse to a
claimant, he may request a reconsideration hearing. 38 Reconsideration
panels are composed of six Board of Veteran Appeals members, including those who originally heard and denied the claim. 39 Reconsideration
4
panels rarely reverse the Board of Veteran Appeals. 0
4. Additional Challenges
The opportunity for further review of an adverse determination terminates abruptly at this point due to the statutory bar to judicial re42
view. 41 This obstacle has been eroded by the courts to some extent.
However, the bar to judicial review of factual determinations made by
the agency in connection with individual claims for benefits remains in
tact.
The impact of the statutory bar to judicial review is made harsher by
the judicial obstruction known as the Feres doctrine. 43 The Feres doctrine
bars suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act 4 against the United States
military and military personnel, in their official or individual capacities,
for injuries sustained incident to military service. The Feres doctrine has
been successfully invoked as a defense by the Government in actions
brought by atomic veterans and their survivors. 45 It has also been successfully raised as a defense in actions brought by civilians who resided
downwind from the test sites and who were therefore exposed to atomic
radiation. 46 There is no indication that Congress intends to create an
exception the the Feres doctrine, in spite of express judicial distate47 for
48
its continued application.
37 See note 20, supra.

38 38 U.S.C. § 3404.
39 Id.

40 See note 20, supra.
41 38 U.S.C. § 211(a).
42 See note 10, supra.
43 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 1355 (1950).
44 28 U.S.C. § 2680 et seq.
41 Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981).
46 See generally, Hearings on S. 1483, The Atomic Radiation Fallout Compensation Act of 1981,
April 8, 1982.
47 "We have held in this case that the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents [recovery] in the
federal courts... Perhaps if Congress is made aware of the seriousness of claims such as [the plaintiff's] it will be moved to grant relief to the individuals who request it, or to change the [Federal Tort
Claims Act] to allow such recoveries in the federal courts. We sincerely hope Congress will do at
least the former." Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981); Lombard v. US., 690
F.2d 215, 227, (9th Cir. 1982).
48 The Radiation Fallout Compensation Act of 1981, S. 1483, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., would have
created a narrow exception to the Feres doctrine for citizens residing downwind from the atomic
blasts. An amendment introduced by Senator Cranston would have extended coverage of the Act to
veterans exposed to radiation resulting from the atomic tests at the Nevada test site and in the Bikini
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III. THE ACT
A. Summary of ProceduralChanges
The purpose of the proposed legislation is two-fold. First, it is intended to improve internal agency procedures for adjudicating all claims.
Second, it is intended to facilitate the development of an administrative
record that will enable a reviewing court to effectively evaluate the proceedings that occurred before the agency. The bill would accomplish
these objectives by codifying existing adjudication procedures and by cre49
ating new internal procedures.
and Eniwetok Atolls in the Marshall Islands, or while occupying Hiroshima and Nagasaki following
the blasts in those cities. The most significant feature of the bill, as amended by Senator Cranston,
would have been the creation of an irrebutable presumption of causation once membership in any of
the eligible categories was established. The bill was referred to the Committee on Veteran Affairs
and the Subcommittee on Agency Administration; it remained dormant through the end of the 96th
Congress and was not subsequently reintroduced.
The Feres doctrine has been the subject of exhaustive writing. With respect to the unsuccessful
attempts of atomic veterans to overcome the Feresbar, see Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d
Cir. 1981) and Broudy v. United States, No. 74-3824 (9th Cir. 1981); Everett v. United States, No.
279127 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Lombard v. United States, No. 81-0425 (D.D.C. 1981). See Thornwell v.
United States, 471 F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1979) for a successful route around the Feres bar (proof of
independent constitutional tort by the military not barred by Feres. But see Kelly v. United States,
512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Penn. 1971) (Feresbars recovery under Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries
resulting from exposure to radiation notwithstanding allegation of post-discharge tortious conduct).
For a discussion of the Feresdoctrine in connection with veterans exposed to dioxin, see generally,In
Re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
See also, The Feres DoctrineAs It Relates To Private Claims, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Agency Administration of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 1982.
See also, Joint Hearing Before The Committee on Labor andHuman Resources and the Subcommittee on Agency Administration of the Committee on the Judiciary on The Potential Dangers of and
Liability for Radioactive Emissions resulting from the Government's Weapons Testing Program, U.S.
Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1982.
49 The bill would codify the agency's burden of proof standard as well as its reasonable doubt
policy, modified to avoid confusion with the reasonable doubt standard in the context of criminal
proceedings. Also codified would be the Board of Veteran Appeals' practice of rendering a decision
based on the entire administrative record. The Board's practice of mailing notice of its decision to a
claimant and his representative would also be codified, with the express requirement that the mailing
of the notice be prompt, thus triggering the 180-day period in which to file an appeal.
The bill would also require that Board decisions be bound and indexed; this requirement is
intended to promote uniformity in Board determinations and to enable the claimant's representative
to better pursue his claim by facilitating research of agency precedent and applicable law.
Additional adjudicatory procedures derived from the Administrative Procedure Act would also
be established. Thus, a claimant would be permitted to present arguments on substantive and procedural issues to fully develop an administrative record capable of withstanding judicial review.
The availability of an independent medical opinion would be expanded to aid in resolving
claims where there is substantial disagreement between the findings or opinions of two physicians on
an issue material to the outcome of a case, such as whether a malignant tumor is radiation-related.
Also provided for is Agency discretion to implement a study of two experimental methods of
internal resolutions of claims.
The statutory limitation on attorney fees for claims resolved prior to or at the time of a final
determination by the Board would be retained. However, the bill would permit contingency agree-
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The most far-reaching change brought about by the bill is the provision permitting judicial review of an adverse determination by the agency
50
in an individual claim for benefits.
B. JudicialReview
t

Title II of the Proposed Veterans Administration Adjudication
Procedures and Judicial Review Act would permit review in federal district court of a final adverse determination of the Veterans Administration in a matter involving a claim for benefits under any law administered
52
by the Veterans Administration.
1. Scope of Review
The scope of review for factual determinations made during adjudication of an individual claim for benefits permits a court to set aside a
finding only if it is "so utterly lacking in a rational basis in the evidence
that a manifest and grievious injustice would result if it were not set
aside."' 53 Prior to setting aside a factual determination under this standard, a reviewing court would be required to specify the deficiencies in
the record upon which it would set aside the finding and remand the case
to the agency for further action consistent with its ruling. 54 The scope of
review for factual determinations made in all other contexts is derived
from the Administrative Procedure Act 55 and will be discussed at length
in Part III of this comment in connection with rulemaking.
The scope of review set forth in this legislation for factual determinations made during an adjudicatory proceeding is unique and accordingly, problematic. Its uniqueness represents mixed intent by members
of the Senate Committee on Veteran Affairs 56 concerning the appropriate
degree of judicial intervention in agency action. The compromise emments between the claimant and his attorney for additional services resulting from an adverse determination by the regional office. The amount would be limited to 25% of any past-due benefits
awarded on the basis of judicial review of the Board's adverse determination. Alternatively, the
claimant and his attorney would be permitted to enter into an agreement under which the attorney
would receive not more that $500.00 for his services. The bill would not eliminate the role of service
representatives within the agency; it would however, allow claimants the benefit of choosing legal
counsel to represent their claims before the agency following an initial adverse determination.
The bill would also bring agency rulemaking within the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act. This provision will be discussed at length in Part III of this comment, infra.
50 S.367 § 301.
51 Id.
52 Id.

53S. 367 § 4026(a)(l)(D).
54S. 367 § 4026(a)(2).
5 5 U.S.C. § 706.
56See generally, Opening remarks before the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, Hearings
on S. 636, March 22, 1983.
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bodies the Committee's deliberate effort to articulate a standard that is
simultaneously manageable and conducive to economic resolution of an
action. More significantly, it represents the Committee's ostensibly emphatic intent to hold reviewing courts to an exceedingly narrow scope of
review; indeed, it embodies the dispute between those members of the
Senate who believed that the judiciary should prevent the Agency from
abusing its discretion and those who believed that the judiciary should
not interfere with Agency decisionmaking. The remand provision contained in the standard further underscores the Committee's intent to prevent a reviewing court from exceeding the bounds of its merely
supervisory role by substituting its judgment for that of the agency.
Anticipating confusion over the unique standard of review, the
Committee developed concerted legislative history to elucidate its intent
and minimize confusion in interpreting the new standard.5 7 Nevertheless, the expectant legislative history cannot be presumed to resolve questions that are likely to arise as a result of the plain language of the
standard, the non-applicability of the substantial evidence test contained
in the Administrative Procedure Act, 58 and the paucity of existing case
law on which to rely in interpreting the new standard of review. These
questions are likely to concern 1) the relationship of the new standard to
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review; 2) the inclusion of the
rational basis language in the new standard; 3) treatment of mixed factual and legal questions under the new standard; and 4) the inherent tendency of the courts to interpret a standard of review as they deem
appropriate.
a. Relationship To The Arbitrary And CapriciousStandard of
Review
The Committee on Veteran Affairs considered incorporating into
the bill the arbitrary and capricious standard of review contained in the
Administrative Procedure Act. 59 Recognizing that review of factual determinations made during adjudicatory proceedings appearing formal
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act 6° requires review under the substantial evidence test, the Committee rejected incorporating the arbitrary and capricious standard into the scope of review in
57 See generally, Report of the Committee on Veterans Affairs To Accompany S. 349, No. 97166, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., June 8, 1982, and Report of the Committee on Veterans Affairs to Accompany S. 367, No. 99-100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., July 8, 1985, pp. 43-45.

58 5 U.S.C. s 706.
59 5 U.S.C. § 553.
60 The language triggering the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act applicable to
review of formal adjudicatory proceedings is "adjudication required by statute to be determined on
the record after opportunity for agency hearing." 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
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order to avoid confusion. 6' Moreover, the Committee feared that a court
faced with review under the arbitrary and capricious standard in a formal proceeding within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act
would fail to adhere to the narrow scope of review contemplated by the
Committee. Incorporating the arbitrary and capricious standard into the
scope of review was also considered problematic due to the confused
body of case law 62 produced by the difference, if any, between the arbi-

trary and capricious and substantial evidence standards of review. Thus,
the Committee endeavored to avoid conflicting results in review of Board
of Veteran Appeals determinations likely to be obtained under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
In spite of these concerns, clearly articulated in the legislative history, the practical relationship of the new standard to the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review remains uncertain and unresolved. On its
face, the language of the new standard is more specific and therefore possibly even more restrictive than the arbitrary and capricious standard,
believed by some to have been slowly expanded by the courts in any
event. Nevertheless, one is left with the impression that under either
standard of review, a court is empowered to set aside a factual determination only if it is irrational or illogical. Indeed, this result would be consistent with already existing practice.
3. Inclusion of the Rational Basis Language
The Committee on Veteran Affairs expressly rejected employing a
rational basis test. 63 A test employing "rational basis" language was rejected because the use of "rational basis" by the Supreme Court to interpret the arbitrary and capricious standard of review was perceived as
having expanded the arbitrary and capricious test.64 Accordingly, the
Committee determined that a rational basis standard would frustrate its
intent to hold courts to a scope of review even narrower than the arbi65
trary and capricious standard.
61 Report of The Committee on Veterans Affairs to Accompany S. 349, No. 97-166, 97th Congress, 2d Sess., June 8, 1982, and Report of the Committee on Veteran Affairs to Accompany S.367,
No. 99-100, 99th Cong., IstSess., July 8, 1985.
62 See note 64, infra.
63 Report of the Committee on Veterans Affairs To Accompany S.349, No. 97-166, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess., pp. 43-45.
64 Citizens to Preserved Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 at 416 (1971); Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284 (1974) ("a decision may reflect
arbitrary and capricious action and it may be supported by substantial evidence); Consolo v. Federal
Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) ("arbitrary and capricious means rational basis;
substantial evidence means that which would convince a reasonable mind.").
65 Report of the Committee on Veterans Affairs To Accompany S.349 No. 97-166, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess., pp. 43-45.
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Interestingly, a "rationality" standard is employed in other military
contexts under these circumstances, the standard connotes a restriction
that is not analogous to the limited review intended by this legislation,
thereby creating the potential for additional confusion. For example, a
rationality test is employed by courts to determine their jurisdiction to
review challenges to military regulations establishing physical standards
or regulating appearance.

66

The court's jurisdiction to review military conduct is traditionally
regarded as limited under the view that the military interest in maintaining a peculiar type of discipline, combined with the need for continued
public confidence in the armed forces, required judicial deference to military expertise and discretion to set standards for the composition of an
able militia. In resolving the question of whether it has jurisdiction to
entertain a challenge to a military regulation, a court will evaluate the
type and degree of expected interference with the military function. 67 In
other words, the court must determine whether the regulation bears a
"rational basis" to promoting the military function.
The use of rational basis language here differs significantly from its
intended use a standard for review of Veterans Administration
decisionmaking.
Agency regulations pertaining to the composition and maintenance
of an able militia represent laws of general application. In this context,
"rationality" calls for judicial deference to military expertise and discretion to promulgate rules bearing a rational relationship to carrying out
the military function. On the other hand, agency adjudication of an individual claim for benefits represents agency action affecting private rights.
In this context, greater judicial intrusion into the agency's conduct is
called for to ensure that the agency is not unlawfully entrenching on private rights by guaranteeing that the agency's determination has a "rational basis in the evidence." Viewed in this light, limited judicial review
of military discretion to establish laws of general application is properly
narrow under a rationality standard designed to determine jurisdiction.
On the other hand, review of agency action affecting private rights under
a standard which requires a rational basis in the evidence to support a
lawful determination is properly determined by an analysis of the record.
The rights at stake and the type of agency action involved in the two
contexts differ considerably and thus impute different meanings to
"rationality."
The inclusion of rational basis language in the new standard of re66

Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).

67 See generally, Report of the Committee on Veteran Affairs to Accompany S.349, No. 97-166,

97th Cong., 2d Sess., June 8, 1982.
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view is intended to confine a reviewing court, nevertheless, the standard
may not be construed as narrowly as the rational basis standard is in
connection with judicial review of military regulations.
3. Mixed Factual and Legal Questions
The Committee on Veteran Affairs rejected a proposed formula for
review of mixed factual and legal questions. 68 Under that standard of
review, a court would have been permitted to review only questions of
law and not questions of fact. 69 However, the Committee was concerned
70
that a standard so demarking judicial review would prove unworkable.
Judicial review of a radiation claim would present a court with a
mixed factual and legal question. For example, judicial review would
center around construction of a statutory term, "service-connection," in
view of undisputed facts, exposure to atomic radiation during or subsequent to an atomic blast. Similarly, an assertion that the veteran's evidence to support his allegation of service-connection raising a reasonable
doubt to be resolved in his favor would also present a court with a hybrid
question. The court would be required to evaluate the undisputed facts
in view of the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Review of the Administrator's construction of the law pertaining to statutory presumptions
would similarly blur the distinction between the legal and factual issues
of a claim.
The Committee was explicit in its intent to permit judicial review,
albeit limited, of mixed factual and legal questions. 7 1 Nevertheless, the
legislative history fails to articulate a distinction between the treatment
of hybrid questions under the new standard of review and their treatment
under the formula that was rejected.
In practice, judicial treatment of mixed factual and legal questions
falls between limited treatment of factual questions and virtually unrestrained treatment of questions of law. 72 Accordingly, judicial review of
adverse determinations made during adjudication of radiation claims
would probably be broader in scope than ostensibly intended by the bill.
68 See generally, Report of The Committee on Veteran Affairs to Accompany S.349, No. 97-106,

97th Cong., 2d Sess., June 8, 1982.
69 Id.
70 "A court, feeling bound by the precise terms of such a preclusion might refuse to review
mixed questions of law and fact so as to avoid any review of a factual issue, thereby leaving a
claimant with limited judicial review; or a court might feel free to examine all questions on the
record by characterizing some facet of a particular question as legal, thereby allowing review under
no significant restraints." Id.
71 Id.
72 For a discussion of the treatment of fact-law questions, see generally, L.L. Jaffee, Judicial
Control of Administrative Action (1965).
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4. Inherent Tendency of the Judiciary to Interpret a Standard of
Review as it Deems Appropriate
Legislative history is not customarily viewed as a successful tool for
behavior modification, and the legislative history developed by the Committee on Veteran Affairs to explain its intent with regard to the unique
standard of review set forth in this bill cannot be expected to alter that
perception. Indeed, the concerted attempt by the Committee to specify
its intent cannot be expected to restrain the inherent tendency of courts
to interpret the scope of a standard of review as they deem appropriate.
Moreover, evidence of mixed Committee intent concerning the desired
breadth of the standard of review would furnish a reviewing court with
sufficient basis to exercise its desired discretion. The likelihood of this
occurring during review of an adverse radiation claim is even greater in
view of evidence suggesting that Senator Cranston, a ranking Committee
member and principal sponsor of this bill apparently had the plight of
73
atomic veterans in mind when drafting this bill.

Atomic veterans seeking judicial review of adverse factual determinations made by the Veterans Administration should not be quickly discouraged by the bill's plain language restricting the scope of review. Nor
should they be discouraged by the legislative history developed by the
Committee on Veterans Affairs expressing its intent to permit a reviewing court to act only in very limited circumstances. The narrow scope of
review is intended to prevent reviewing courts from substituting their
judgment for that of the Agency in cases where the claimant happens to
be dissatisfied with an adverse determination on his claim for benefits.
However, the desire to provide for even very limited judicial review
reveals the Committee's recognition that in certain cases, agency determinations made while adjudicating a veteran's claim for benefits have
had grievous results. The Veterans Administration is the sole agency
charged with providing benefits to veterans. Moreover, atomic veterans
may not resort to a remedy in tort to obtain compensation for their injuries. In view of the high incidence of specific diseases occurring in
atomic veterans, together with the absence of other legal avenues by
which to obtain compensation for their losses, a reviewing court might
well conclude that an adverse determination made while adjudicating a
radiation claim must be set aside under the standard of review to avoid a
"manifest grievous injustice."
73 See, Veterans Claims For Disabilities From Nuclear Weapons Testing: Hearings before the
Committee on Veterans Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979, chaired by Senator Cranston, during
which he remarked that "significant improvements should be made in claims adjudication
procedures."
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IV. RULEMAKING
74

A. Present Rulemaking Procedures

Until recently, the Veterans Administration was not required by
statute to comply with any of the rulemaking procedures contained in
the Administrative Procedure Act. However, the agency elected to comply with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act applicable
to informal rulemaking. 75 The regulation 76 containing the Agency's vol77
untary compliance with these procedures has the binding effect of law,

78
and failure to comply is grounds for a procedural challenge to the rule.

However, the regulation permits the Administrator to waive compliance
with rulemaking procedures in cases where public participation would be
"impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. ' 79 Moreover, the regulation does not avoid the dilemma posed by the Agency's
practice of characterizing internal documents as other than rules, 80 thus
avoiding compliance with rulemaking procedures.
B. Rulemaking Under The Proposed Legislation
In addition to eliminating the Administrator's authority to waive
compliance with rulemaking procedures, the bill would require the
agency to promulgate legislative 8' rules in accord with the provisions of
82
the Administrative Procedure Act applicable to informal rulemaking.
74 Since the submission of this Comment for publication, the documents discussed in part IV in
connection with rulemaking are no longer relied upon by the Veterans Administration to resolve
radiation claims, pursuant to the settlement of Gott v. Cleland, No. 80-0906 (D.D.C. 1981), decided
sub nom Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The documents are included here for the
purposes of discussion.
75 5 U.S.C. § 553(a).
76 38 C.F.R. § 1.12.
77 Carter v. Cleland, 643 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Del Valle v. Cleland, No. 79-2174 slip op.
(D.P.R. 1980); Rodway v. United States Department of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
78 See generally, Gott v. Cleland, No. 80-0906 (D.D.C. 1981); decided sub nom Gott v. Walters,
756 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1985). This decision was subsequently vacated in an unpublished opinion.
79 Id.

Id.
Legislative rules within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act are broadly defined
as creating new duties and narrowing substantially the agency's discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.
82 5 U.S.C. § 553(a). The agency would continue to be required to publish all proposed legislative rules in the Federal Register for not less than 30 days. During this period, the agency would
receive written submissions from interested parties, following which the rules would be published
with an explanation of their purpose, the bases on which they were promulgated, and where applicable, the agency's failure to incorporate relevant public comment. Noncompliance with any of these
procedures would continue to be grounds for suit to compel proper compliance or to invalidate the
80
81

rules as unlawfully promulgated.
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1. Rules Governing Radiation Claims
Although the Agency presently has authority 83 to issue regulations
governing radiation claims, until recently it has failed to promulgate such
rules due to its conceded lack of technical expertise in the areas of health
85
dosimetry and physics. In response to Executive8 4 and Congressional
pressure, the Defense Nuclear Agency 8 6 in conjunction with the Veterans
Administration developed guidelines for use in adjudicating claims for
benefits by veterans exposed to atomic radiation during the atomic tests.
The guidelines were intended to promote uniformity in an area of claims
adjudication previously resolved on a case-by-case basis. 87 The guide88
lines consisted of three documents: 1) The Radiation Program Guide,
2) The Memorandum of Understanding, 89 and 3) The Radiation Procedures. 90 These documents formed the basis for the resolution of all radiation claims. 9 1
The Radiation Program Guide was developed by the Defense Nuclear Agency. It contains a methodology for attributing radiation exposure levels to veterans for whom film badge data is unavailable. A
maximum safe radiation exposure level of .05 rem 92 is set forth in the
Radiation Program Guide based on the maximum safe annual occupational radiation exposure level established by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. The Radiation Program Guide instructs the Veterans Administration to utilize the Guide only for resolving claims involving cancer or thyroid disorders. 93 The Defense Nuclear Agency believes that
radiation exposure is not the cause of other disease occurring in atomic
veterans, such as lymphomas and genetic disorders. 94 The Radiation
Program Guide applies only to veterans present during the atomic blasts
conducted at the Nevada test site; it expressly does not apply to veterans
who occupied Hiroshima or Nagasaki following the atomic blasts in
those cities. 95 The basis for this preclusion was two-fold. First, the neu83 38 U.S.C. § 310.
84 In 1978 President Carter established the Interagency Task Force on Health Effects of Ionizing
Radiation.
85 See, Veterans Claims For Disabilities From Nuclear Weapons Testing: Hearings before the
Committee on Veterans Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979.

86 The Defense Nuclear Agency, formerly the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and a
component of the Department of Defense, conducted the nuclear weapons testing program.
87 See, note 85, supra.
88 47 Fed. Reg. No. 98, May 20, 1982 pp. 21853-21859.
89 Id.

o Id.
91 See supra n.75.

92 A rem, "roentegen equivalent man," is a unit measurement for radiation.
93 47 Fed. Reg. No. 98, May 20, 1982, pp. 21853-21859.
94 Id.
95 Id.

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

250

[Vol. 4:235

tron radiation to which the occupying troops were exposed is believed to
have been insufficiently toxic to result in the diseases occurring in atomic
veterans. Second, the levels of gamma radiation present in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in the days following the atomic blasts were well below the
levels considered by the Agency to be toxic.
The Memorandum of Understanding was an agreement between the
Defense Nuclear Agency and the Veterans Administration providing
that the Veterans Administration will rely exclusively on the information
contained in the Radiation Program Guide for resolution of radiation
claims. 96 The Radiation Procedures was a document prepared by the
Veterans Administration for the Agency's regional offices. It contained
guidelines for resolving radiation claims at the regional offices based on
97
the contents of the Radiation Program Guide.
The assumptions and conclusions underlying the dosimetry methodology contained in the Radiation Program Guide were dispositive of the
efforts by atomic veterans to establish service-connection for their disabilities. Consequently, the Radiation Program Guide was the most significant of the three documents.
The question of whether the three documents are legislative rules
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act was recently
litigated,98 their legal status for purposes of the applicability of the
rulemaking requirements contained in the Administrative Procedure Act
remains uncertain. Assuming, however, for purposes of discussion here
that these documents were legislative rules, the Radiation Program
Guide forms the basis for the following discussion involving the standard
of review for factual determinations made during agency rulemaking.
2. Standard of Review
The standard of review for factual determinations made by the Veterans Administration during informal rulemaking permits a reviewing
court to set aside determinations that are deemed to be arbitrary and
capricious. 99

The precise meaning of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review has been the subject of considerable litigation' ° and extensive commentary. Considered at one time to be narrower than the substantial
evidence test, 10 1 it has been expanded by courts grappeling with its rela96

Id.

97 Id.

98 See note 78, supra.
99 S. 636, Title III; 5 U.S.C. § 553(a).
100 See generally, note 12, supra.
101 See generally, note 64.
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tionship to the substantial evidence standard of review, resulting in divergent bodies of case law.10 2 Although the judiciary has exercised restraint
in setting aside determinations made during informal rulemaking, it will
act if the determinations made during the rulemaking proceedings are
arbitrary or capricious and, therefore, fail to effectuate the mandate of
03
the organic Act.'
The principal assumptions relied on by the Defense Nuclear Agency
in developing the Radiation Program Guide and the dosimetry methodology in particular have until recently been viewed in the scientific and
medical communities as sound. However, recent research' °4 poses a serious challenge to the Agency's two principle assumptions: 1) the level at
which gamma radiation is believed to be safe and 2) the actual doses of
0 5
radiation believed to have been received by the test participants.
One study, conducted by the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta,
was based on interviews with 95.% of the survivors of the SMOKY
test. 0 6 The study found a statistically significant increase in the occurence of leukemia and polytherma vera, and illness which previously
had not been shown to be caused by exposure to ionizing radiation. The
researchers content that the principal significance of these results is their
support for the assertion that recorded and attributed levels of radiation
exposure inaccurately reflect the actual doses received by the test participants. Interview with the surviving test participants revealed that actual
individual and troop activity differed considerably from the preoperation
orders relied on by the Defense Nuclear Agency in developing the Radiation Program Guide.
Additional research conducted at the Oak Ridge Laboratories in
Tennessee, and at the Lawrence-Livermore Laboratories in California,
suggests that levels of gamma radiation previously thought to be safe
have been significantly underestimated. This research is of particular significance to occupying troops suffering from disease that may have reId.
See generally, notes 97, 98, 99, and 100, supra.
104 For example, in Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Association v. State Farm Mutual, 463 U.S. 29

102

103

(1983), the Supreme Court set aside a determination by the National Highway Traffic Administration to rescind a regulation requiring new motor vehicles produced after 1982 to be equipped with
passive restraints on grounds that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. In so ruling, the Court
determined that the agency failed to articulate a connection between the facts found and the choices
made, thus failing to carry out the policies committed to it by Congress.
105 See, Science, "New A-Bomb Studies Alter Radiation Estimates," Vol. 212, May 22, 1981;
Glyn G. Caldwell, M.D., Center For Disease Control, Statement before the Senate Committee on
Veteran Affairs, April 6, 1983.
106 In State Farm, supra, the Court recognized that agencies do not establish rules of conduct
intended to last forever. Arguably, agencies must respond to changing circumstances in order to
carry out the mandate of its organic act.
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suited from exposure to toxic levels of radiation, yet who are considered
by the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Veterans Administration to have
been exposed to safe levels of atomic radiation. These studies suggest
that even the relatively low levels of gamma radiation present at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to which occupying troops were exposed, may have
been unsafe.
Together, these studies pose a serious challenge to the two principal
determinations made by the Defense Nuclear Agency in developing the
Radiation Program Guide: 1) that the majority of atomic veterans received doses of radiation falling below .05 rem and 2) that exposure to
radiation below .05 rem is not sufficiently toxic to result in disorders such
as those occurring in atomic veterans. These determinations have a direct bearing on the adverse determinations made by the Veterans Administration during adjudication of radiation claims resulting in the denial of
10 7
benefits to atomic veterans and their survivors.
3. Application of the Standard of Review To Factual Issues
A successful to the factual determinations underlying the dosimetry
methodology contained in the Radiation Program Guide must demonstrate that those determinations were arbitrary and capricious. The
court must also be persuaded that deference to agency expertise in matters "bordering on the frontiers of scientific knowledge"' 0 8 under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review would be inappropriate under
these circumstances. The likelihood of a successful challenge to the factual determinations made by the Defense Nuclear Agency during the development of the Radiation Program Guide is dubious. The data relied
upon by the agency in making its determination are highly technical and
subject to different interpretation in the scientific and medical communities. Even in State Farm the court recognized that an agency possesses
expertise to "pass upon the generalizability" of certain studies and that
such issues are precisely the type of issue which rests within the expertise
an agency. That the Defense Nuclear Agency would draw a conclusion
from specific data where another conclusion might also be reached fails
to support an assertion that the determination was in any way arbitrary
or capricious. However, a successful challenge to the factual determinations made by the agency while developing the Guide might depend on
the interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review relied on by the reviewing court.
Id. The SMOKY test was conducted at the Nevada test site in 1957.
108 See generally, note 109.
107
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a. Narrow Interpretation
Under a narrow interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, a court may not set aside an agency's factual determination if the determination finds any support in the record. The support
need not be overwhelming, or even ample, it need only satisfy the court
that the agency had some basis on which to make its determination.
Under this interpretation of the standard, it is unlikely that a reviewing
court would find the determinations underlying the Guide to be arbitrary
or capricious. A cursory review of the record would furnish support or
the Agency's factual determinations, the Defense Nuclear Agency relied
on extensive scientific and statistical research concerning the effects of
the atomic blasts in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the civilian populations
in those cities. Additional data consisting of film badge records developed and compiled by the agency itself for use in evaluating the nuclear
weapons testing program also formed the basis for the Agency's
determination.
Even if the public had been permitted to provide the Agency with
written submissions, presumably including the results of the studies described in the previous section, a court would probably conclude only
that the scientific and medical communities cannot agree on the health
effects of exposure to atomic radiation. Believing that such a dispute is
beyond its expertise, a court would feel compelled to defer to the expertise of the Defense Nuclear Agency.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that a reviewing court would conclude
that the factual determinations made by the Defense Nuclear Agency in
developing the Radiation Program Guide were arbitrary and capricious.
b. Broad Interpretation
A successful challenge to the factual determinations made by the
Defense Nuclear Agency during the development of the Radiation Program Guide might occur if the reviewing court relied on a broader interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. A broad
interpretation of the standard requires the agency to offer a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choices made." 0 9 Thus, the
determination must represent a clear error of judgment if it is to be set
aside. 110
A broader interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review makes the development of a comprehensive administrative record
109 First National Bank of Fayetteville v. Smith, 508 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir. 1974).
110 Motor Vehicles Manufacturer Assn. v. State Farm Mutual, 463 U.S. 29 (1983), quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 196 (1962).
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much more significant that it otherwise would be. During the public
comment period, interested parties would want to submit the results of
the research mentioned in the previous section, in addition to documentation of increased incidents of specific illness in atomic veterans. Interested parties might want to argue that the level of radiation exposure
presumed to be safe by the Defense Nuclear Agency was developed by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an agency with an interest in promoting an image of safety in the nuclear energy industry. The wisdom of
relying on the determination of safe levels of radiation exposure by an
interested agency is questionable. The Defense Nuclear Agency is similarly interested in the continued viability of the government's nuclear
weapons program. It is certainly conceivable that the agency would interpret data with a bias in favor of safeguarding its nuclear weapons testing program. Accordingly, interested parties would want to draw the
attention of a reviewing court to determinations made by either of these
Agencies as to the likelihood of toxic radiation exposure to determine
whether the agencies offered a rational connection between the facts
found and the choices made.
Nevertheless, a court might decide to defer to agency expertise in
dosimetry. One method of overcoming this obstacle would be to distinguish cases in which courts have deferred to agency expertise in promulgating safety standards."'
For example, in promulgating the asbestos standard, the Secretary
of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) determined that asbestos is hazardous at a level lower than the record suggested. In upholding that determination, 12 the court observed that some
of the questions underlying the promulgation of the standard bordered
on the frontiers of scientific knowledge." 3 Consequently, decisionmaking depended to a greater extent on policy judgments rather than purely
factual analysis. In deferring to the Secretary's expertise in an area of
new regulation where existing methodologies were deficient, the court
noted that the Secretary exercised his discretion to carry out OSHA's
mandate to provide all workers with a work place free from occupational
hazards." 4 The court deferred to the Secretary's discretion because it
represented a policy judgment to carry out the mandate of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in the best interest of workers. In stark
contrast, the determinations made by the Defense Nuclear Agency and
by the Veterans Administration in agreeing to rely exclusively on the
I

Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966); State Farm, supra.

112 See, note 108, supra.
113

Id.

114

Id.
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Radiation Program Guide, arguably represented a policy judgment that
is hostile to the Veterans Administrations's exclusive charge to provide
care and compensation to all veterans injured during service. Moreover,
judicial deference to the expertise of the Defense Nuclear Agency would
be inappropriate. Although the agency can properly be expected to possess unique expertise pertaining to nuclear weapons testing, it cannot be
expected to possess unique expertise in the field of health physics or radiobiology. In fact, the Agency's lack of expertise in these areas is evidenced by its continued belief that a high incidence of radiation-related
disease is inconclusively linked to radiation exposure during its nuclear
testing program.
Interestingly, in another case" 15 the Court acknowledged that even
available data may not settle a regulatory issue. Under these circumstances, the agency must exercise its judgment in "moving from the facts
and probabilities on the record to a policy conclusion. The Court went
on to warn that uncertainty does not imply that it is sufficient for an
agency to recite "substantial uncertainty" as a justification for its actions.
The Court's reasoning is compelling. Numerous decisions by the
Veterans Administration denying benefits to atomic veterans have been
upheld by Courts in deference to the agency's determination that substantial uncertainty as to the connection between radiation exposure and
illness requires a policy determination that such illness is not serviceconnected.
The opportunity for judicial review provides hope that under State
Farm this alleged uncertainty, absent a satisfactory explanation in the
record, represents a clear error of judgment and is thus arbitrary and
capricious.
It is apparent that the lack of public participation in the development of the Radiation Program Guide seriously jeopardized the rights of
atomic veterans pursuing claims for benefits in the Veterans Administration. Public participation in the development of the Guide would have
supplied the Agency with information from which different conclusions
might have been drawn. It would also have permitted greater opportunity for ventilation of the policy choices to be made. Had the Veterans
Administration been required to promulgate legislative rules in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, atomic veterans pursuing
claims before the agency might be more confident that the guidelines
under which their claims are resolved accurately comprehend the factual
circumstances surrounding their controversial claims.
115 Mohr Vehicle Manufacturing Association v. State Farm Mutual, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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V. CONCLUSION

Atomic veterans have remained largely uncompensated for injuries
resulting from their exposure to radiation while participating in the testing of nuclear weapons under the auspices of the United States. In view
of the restraints imposed on veterans by the Feres doctrine, judicial review of adverse radiation claims would at the very least test the discretion of the Agency.
The Proposed Veterans Administration
Adjudication Procedures and Judicial Review Act promises to provide
this fundamental safeguard. The internal reforms brought about by the
bill are significant to atomic veterans to the extent that they facilitate the
development of a comprehensive administrative record for judicial
review.
But the most far-reaching reform, for atomic veterans, brought
about by the bill lies in the opportunity to challenge the Agency's denial
of their claims for benefits. To be sure, a question arises as to the extent
to which judicial involvement will actually aid the atomic veteran in obtaining compensation for his injuries. While that inquiry implicates
broader questions as to whether judicial intervention in agency action is
always beneficial, or even desirable, those troubling questions invite future comment. To the extent that the courts will ensure that the Veterans Administration complies with its mandate, judicial involvement is
necessary and desirable. Judicial review would be more valuable were
Congress to enact legislation requiring the Veterans Administration to
provide benefits to atomic veterans. Interpretation of the unique scope of
review contained in the bill promises to be problematic. However, even if
a court adheres to the narrow standard envisioned by the Senate Committee on Veteran Affairs, atomic veterans may prevail. The unfavorable
treatment of radiation claims by the Veterans Administration appears to
be the type of injustice that the legislation is designed to remedy. Moreover, the inherent tendency of the courts to expand a standard of review
might increase the likelihood of a successful challenge by an atomic veteran to an adverse treatment of his claim.
Competent rulemaking is equally important to ensure that atomic
veterans obtain benefits for their disabilities from the Veterans Administration. To the extent that the Veterans Administration chooses to characterize internal documents as rules, it will be required to comply with
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act applicable to informal rulemaking and incorporated into this bill.
Public participation in agency rulemaking will ensure that rules governing resolution of radiation claims accurately comprehend the complex
factual circumstances surrounding those claims. The opportunity to
challenge determinations underlying the rules governing radiation claims
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made during rulemaking proceedings provides the atomic veteran with at
least limited opportunity to challenge those determinations.
A successful challenge to the factual determinations made by the
Defense Nuclear Agency in developing the Radiation Program Guide
would be more likely to occur under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, by persuading the court that the decision that the illnesses of atomic veterans are not service-connected lacks a rational basis
in the record. It would also require persuading a reviewing court that
deference to the expertise of the Defense Nuclear Agency would be inappropriate under the circumstances.

